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We need  not be  overawed by the  size  of the problem  of  a competitive-
structure  policy for commercial  agriculture.  Nor dare we retreat  into some
nice  esoteric  shelter.  We  are  extension  economists,  and we  retreat  before
nothing.  For we know  that decisions  affecting  the future  of  agriculture  are
going  to be made-by  someone,  on some  basis or  other; and  if we  are  to
fulfill  our mission we must try,  if not to maximize the knowledge  available
to  decision  makers,  then to  minimize  the ignorance.
However,  we  need  to  be aware  of  some  pitfalls.  The  economic  world
is  infinite  and  man's understanding  is  finite.  Because  of this  overwhelming
fact,  all  economic  thought  rests  on  simplification.  The  nature  of  the  eco-
nomic  world  requires  abstracting  from  the  whole  of  reality  in  order  to
accommodate  the  capacity  of  the  human  brain.  Hence,  we  may  over-
simplify.  A second danger  is that we each  tend to build our own  analytical
model  to  our own  taste  and then  consider  which  model  is  best.  Another
pitfall  can be  to focus  on a few  issues  and take all others for  granted. Still
another  is  to  attach  value  judgments  of high  emotive  content  to  the  lan-
guage  of the structure  for agriculture  and thus  impede rational  analysis.
SINGLENESS  OF  GOAL
My  first  category  of  illustrations  is what I  call  monotheism  concerning
goals  for our agricultural  structure.  We have the efficiency-above-all  school;
it  seems  to  assume  we  are  on  the  brink  of  destitution  and  physical  effi-
ciency  must  be  the  overriding  goal.  We  have  the man-on-the-land  school,
and  it  has  two  branches,  one  based  on  socio-cultural  values  in  the rural
environment  and  the other  on  a more pragmatic  keep-'em-out-of-the-cities
point  of view. Another  school bases all  on freedom from government,  call-
ing for "a market system  and not  a government  system"  in disregard of the
fact  that  our  price  programs  to  date  have  notably  worked  through  the
market.
May I point out here that  although  I am perhaps  being  slightly caustic
my criticism  applies only to the practice  of reducing  everything to  a single
issue.  Each  of  these  goals  has  merit-efficiency,  rural  environment,  pre-
serving  self-regulating  aspects  of  a  market  system. My  target  is  solely  the
oversimplification,  the  single-goal  feature.
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existing  centers  of  power,  and  its  technique  is  to  deride  or  even  ridicule.
Have  you  heard  slogans  such  as,  "Modern  technology  dooms  the  family
farm,"  or  as another  version  that capital  requirements  do the  same  thing?
Then  there  are  such  lines  as,  "We  didn't  preserve  the  family  grocer,  did
we?"  Closely related  are words  denouncing those  of us who are  concerned
for  our  subject  for  "indulging  in  nostalgia"  or  for  being,  the most  tren-
chant  of all  single words,  almost  an epithet,  "fundamentalists."
We  cannot omit the  hand wringing  and mind-shackling  philosophy,  "I
don't  like the  way things  are going  but I  don't want  to put  any restriction
on  anyone's  right  to  invest  a  dollar  as  he  sees  fit."  This  is  the  creed  of
capitalism  of the  crudest  and  greediest  kind,  long  since  abandoned  (in  its
absolute  sense)  in  most  of  the  economy.
And  then  to  illustrate  some  other  lines:  "You  can't repeal  the  law  of
supply  and  demand,"  or  that  granddaddy  of  all  tranquilizing  bromides,
"The  really  modern,  efficient  family  farmer  will  be  able  to  survive."  This
last  is an  inversion:  it takes  the answer  we want and makes  it our premise.
DO  OUR  INSTITUTIONS  SELF-GENERATE?
Surely  one  basic  proposition  underlies  our  discussion.  If  there  is  any
point  in even  considering our subject,  we must accept the  thesis that James
Shaffer built into an  excellent  article  published  in the May  1969 American
Journal  of Agricultural  Economics. This thesis  is that "institutional  innova-
tion"  is a  "necessary  activity"  and that it  is properly  a part of our obliga-
tion as a democratic  nation to organize  our institutions  "to direct the system
to  achieve  desired  goals  rather  than  accept  whatever  pattern  of  organiza-
tion  evolves."  In other words,  we cannot  assume that an economic  system
conforming  to  our  goals  will  emerge  automatically.  Economic  institutions
do not come  about as a natural process but are man-made  through custom,
convention,  and  law;  and  if we  want  those  institutions  to meet  our goals,
we  must  tool  them  to  that  end.  And  like  Biblical  injunctions,  there  is  a
warning too:  the penalty  for failing to  achieve institutional  change through
wisely  directed  evolution is to have  it come  about in sudden upheaval, that
is,  violent revolution.
Whether  tagged  as  fundamentalism  or  not,  we  are  truly  dealing  with
fundamentals.  How,  indeed,  shall  our  common  resources  for  producing,
processing,  and  distributing our  food  and  fiber  be  organized?  Particularly,
what shall be the institutions for ownership and management  of that unique
and  scarce  resource,  the  land,  and what  form of relationship  shall  prevail
for those  who till  it?
Our  national  policy  has  long  had  two  prongs.  One  is  to  assure  an
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our  ancestors  scurrying  to  our  hemisphere  would  be  repeated.  The  other
looks  to  the status  of the man on the  land.  Status  was  first wrapped up  in
provisions  for  fee  simple  ownership  and  then  in  legalized  squatting  that
was eventually  built into the Homestead  Act. As the farm economy  became
more  commercial,  it  was  seen  that  not  land institutions  alone but  market
institutions  as  well  had much to  do with the  farmer's  destiny.  To this  day,
we have  a  two-way choice in how we look at competitive-structure  policies
for  commercial  agriculture:  Do  we  consider  mainly  how land  is  held  and
the  farmer's  relation  to  it,  or  do  we  think  more  about  income  protection
as  such?
There is  no denying the appeal that land ownership  has for the farmer,
and  it  deserves  to  be  treated  with  respect.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is
evidence that some farmers  are less  concerned for that traditional  badge of
status  and security than  for other  means  to protect their opportunities  and
income.  According  to  this  second  attitude,  farmers  do  not  mind  being
tenants  or  entering  into  contracts  provided  they  are  assured  of  adequate
income  from  doing  so.  Some  of us  read into this  proviso  a veiled warning
of  nonsubmissiveness.  We  suspect that  if farmers who  elect other  sources
of  security  do not  attain it,  they  will be  quick to  join in  defensive  action
such  as forming  bargaining  fronts.  Or to switch momentarily  to  a popular
phraseology,  if  we  adopt  a  more  industrial  structure  of  agriculture,  less
tied  to  land,  we  can  expect  to  see  industrial type  countermovements  pop
up.  They  could  be  nasty  sometimes.
INSTITUTIONS  OF  LANDHOLDING,  MODERN  STYLE
So long  as food  is  produced  from  land, it  will  be  a  matter  of  national
importance  how land  is  held  and  used.  National  goals  for land begin with
insuring  against  its  mistreatment-the  conservation  goal.  They  extend  to
making  certain  that the land resource,  like  any  other resource  that is  fixed
for  an  appreciable  length  of time,  be  employed  productively  and  in a  way
that equitably  distributes  income.  In other words,  until we produce  all our
food  in  chemical  retorts  we  will  re-echo  an  ancient  concern  for  the po-
tentially  exploitive  monopoly power of land ownership.  That  danger  is  just
as  real  today  as  it  ever  was.  In  view  of  trends  toward  conglomerate
organization  of the industrial economy,  already branching  into land owner-
ship, it may also be imminent.
It is a  classic principle that landholding  generates  an unearned  income.
In  an  expanding  economy  such  an  income  can  mount  steadily.  It follows
that  if  landholding  moves  out  of  farmers'  hands  into  those  of  a  separate
class  of the  population,  that class  will have the  marks  of a rentier  class-
which  has  been  antagonistic  to  democratically  defined  values  and  goals
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small  landholder  agriculture  is that  the whole  issue  of unearned  income  is
almost  washed  out.  The  amount  of  residual  unearned  increment  received
by each  person  is  so  small  as to be socially  inconsequential.  Moreover,  the
family farmer who owns  his land not only combines  his returns to land and
labor  but  apparently  bids  some  of  his  labor  income  into  the paying  price
of land  (in  exchange  for status  and security).
But  the  income  distribution  issue  in  landholding  systems  does not  end
there.  For  it  has  been  national  economic  policy for  decades  not  to permit
distribution  of income  in  the  U.S.  economy  to be  governed  solely by  con-
trol  over  factors  of production.  On  the  one  hand,  high  incomes  resulting
from  favorable  situations  are  cut back  by  means  of  a  graduated  income
tax.  On the  other,  various  policies  affect  income  distribution  directly.  As
an  example  of the  latter,  measures  to bolster  farm  incomes  by  managing
the  land resource  (i.e.,  land  retirement)  tend to  funnel  the  added  income
solely  to landholders.  Some  provisions  in income  tax laws  and regulations
have  materially  affected  incentives  for  landholding-some  would  say,
devastatingly.  Allegedly,  they make  it more attractive for nonfarm interests
to  buy  into  farming.  Currently  it  is  sometimes  more  profitable  to  farm
income  tax  rules  than  land.
OTHER  AGRICULTURAL  RESOURCES
Land  is  only  one  of  the  four  factors  of  production.  But  it  has  long
been quick  to form protective  unions-though  it  is  now  doing  so in  some
rules  for the  labor  element  in farming.  Not even nonfarm  hired labor has
been  quick  to  form  protective unions-though  it  is  now  doing  so  in  some
places.
On  the whole,  national  policy has  been to facilitate  and  even  subsidize
the flow  of labor,  capital,  and management  into farming.  Hence, the  policy
issue  concerns  not  whether  the  labor  component  in  farm  production  has
been  kept  too  restricted  but  whether  it  has  been  so  plentiful  as  to  de-
preciate  its  price  in  the  market.
And yet,  certain changes  in the design of farm programs  in recent years
at  least  lean toward  giving  some benefit  to labor  instead  of giving  it all to
land.  In my view  the greater use of direct parity payments does this. More-
over,  quantity quotas,  now in force for flue-cured  tobacco  but occasionally
proposed  for other  crops,  offer  a good  chance  of dividing  benefits  among
the  several  factors  of production  instead of giving them  all to land.  So far
as  federal  marketing  orders  regulate  quantity  of  product  marketed,  the
benefit  is shared  among  factors  of production  and not returned exclusively
to  land.
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The  last few  pages  have dealt  with one  kind  of  fundamental,  the con-
trol over  resources  used in farming.
Now  we  will  consider  the  other  side  of  the  coin:  how  the  whole
production  and  distribution  mechanism  is  to be  directed.
The  modern  economy  rests  on  division  of labor-division  by  process,
by firm, by geographic  region.  The finer the division, the more complicated
is  the  process  by  which  the  separate  activities  are  linked  together,  co-
ordinated,  synchronized.  To consider  how that directional  control  is  to be
achieved  is a good expositionary  device  for reviewing  competitive-structure
questions.
Traditionally,  the  control  system in agriculture  has been that of market
exchange.  The  basis  of exchange  was  monetary price.  A  large  part of the
system  was based  on physical  assembly  of products  which was both a  step
in  physical  distribution  and  a means to  arrive  at price.  Private and public
services  of many kinds have been provided  to keep the mechanism  running
smoothly.
The  system  extended  through  all  stages  from  the  farm  to  the  con-
sumer;  it  was  not confined  to the terminal  points.  Being  price-oriented,  it
minimized  nonprice  activity.  In  fact,  a  true  market  price  system  permits
informational  advertising  but by  definition  excludes  promotion  as such.
The  market  exchange  system  based  on  commodity  price  has  many
merits.  It also  has  some weaknesses.  Its  great strength  is its  impersonality,
its freedom from centers  of power.  It is a decentralized  system  in which no
single  agent  wields  power  over another.  If it works  well it  achieves  equity
-no  person,  however  small  and weak,  is  excluded,  nor is he  discriminated
against.
The weakness  of the  market system  is not usually  considered to  be on
the  distributive  side-it gets  a product,  once  produced,  through  the chan-
nels  pretty well-but  in  the  directional  control  mechanism.  Price  signals
in production  and marketing,  say the  critics,  do not  regulate production as
well  as  modern  markets  require.  This charge  is hard  to refute.  Yet there
are at least  two caveats:  (1)  we have not tried as hard as we might;  (2)  it
is not that the price system has  suddenly proved so faulty, but that so much
more  is  expected  of  it.  In  particular,  the  pressure  has  become  intense  to
achieve  more  precision  in  directional  control  than  formerly;  and  as  in-
dustrial merchandising  techniques  have spread to farm products  and foods,
less  emphasis  is  placed  on commodity  price  and  more is  focused  on  non-
price  devices.
By  way  of  illustration,  a  price-oriented  market  exchange  system  has
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floor  (support)  prices;  (2)  vertical  integration,  and  now  conglomerate
merger,  among  market  firms;  (3)  vertical  integration  into  farming,  by
means  of resource  ownership  or  production  and  marketing  contracts;  (4)
consignment  marketing;  (5)  formula  pricing;  (6)  merchandising  by  non-
price  competitive  methods  in  partial  replacement  of  price;  (7)  market
order  pricing  in  fluid  milk;  (8)  bargained  pricing.
PRESSURES  AT  WORK
Most of my remarks  thus far  have been descriptive  and conceptual  but
have not touched  on the  nature of the dynamic  forces that are  at work.  By
no  stretch  of  the  imagination  should  or  can  those  forces  be  disregarded.
Our  object,  as  in  all policy,  is to  channel  forces  and  direct  their outcome.
It  is  not to bow  supinely before  them, nor to ignore them, nor, least of all,
totally to block  them.
In  my  judgment  many  of  the  forces  arise  not  within  agriculture  but
outside  it.  My  list  will  include  both.
Perhaps  most familiar  is  the  advance  in  technology.  It  is  also  hoary
with  age  and  overrated.  Our  generation  enjoys  no  special  status  where
technological  change  is  concerned.  The  steel  moldboard  plow  was  more
revolutionary  than  the  tractor,  and the  reaper  more  than  the  combine.
In  my  jargon  technology  is  how-to-do-it,  and  though  definitionally
separate  it  works  hand  in  glove  with  the  development  and  use  of  more
nonfarm  inputs  in  farming.  The  structural  meaning  of  advancing  tech-
nology  is  that  more  scientific  knowledge  is  now  required  of  the  farmer,
which  raises  questions  of how  to provide  that knowledge  and whether the
farmer  can  continue  to  be  a  generalist.  Alongside  these  policy  questions
are  the  implications  of greater  use  of purchased  inputs  in  farming,  which
put  more  emphasis  on  the  market  or  nonmarket  system  by  which  those
inputs,  plus  accompanying  finance  capital,  are  required.
I rate  various institutional  changes  as  more important than  technology
as  such.  One  is  the  conversion  of  the  farm  product  marketing  system  to
industrial  type  operations  that demand  a  regular  and systematic  supply  of
raw  products.  This  comes  hard  in  farming.  More  exact  control  over  the
farm  economy  is  now  required.
I repeat  for  emphasis,  the  marketing  system  has  also  turned  to  mer-
chandising  instead  of  solely  price-controlled  marketing.  Merchandising
techniques  rest on differentiation  of product and the accompanying  promo-
tion  and  nonprice  methods  of  competition.  Much  of  the  differentiation
comes  from  processing,  but  not  all;  and to  the  extent market  firms  want
to  begin  with  a  distinctive  product  obtained  from  the  farm,  they  run
62counter  to  the  traditional  principle  that  farms  should  turn  out  standard
products.
In  a word,  what this  means  is that market firms find  it advantageous  to
bring  farm  sources  directly  under  their  control  for  purposes  of  engaging
in  merchandising  strategy.  This is  a  powerful  force.  It helps to explain  the
call  for  "specification  production"  by  farmers  and  accounts  for  some  of
the  market-firm  pressure  for  vertical  integration  into  farming.
Farm  supply  firms  are  interested  in  integrating  into  farming  for  a
matching yet  different  reason.  They  want  a regular  and dependable  outlet
for  their products;  and  they  want  to  maintain  it  at minimum  cost.  I  am
convinced  that the biggest  cause for contractual  integration  in broilers was
feed  mills'  wish to sew up their feed markets  without having to hire sales-
men  and buy  advertising-and  they  wanted  least of all to engage  in price
cutting  wars  with competitors.
These  brief  remarks  do not begin to  do justice  to the various  kinds  of
pressures being  brought to bear to alter  the time-honored  market exchange
form of relationship  between  farming and its supplying  and outlet markets.
In  particular  I  have  not  touched  on  size  and  power  of  the  old  fashioned
kind-old  but  getting  a  new  style  in the conglomerate  movement.  We  do
not understand  clearly  all that is  at work  but some  of us suspect that part
of the  motivation is pursuit  of power for its own sake,  and size for its own
sake,  and  fiscal  inflation  protection  and  other  fiduciary  objectives  also
for  their  own  sake.  But  perhaps  these  cursory  remarks  will  suffice  to
establish  the  point  that  many  of  the  forces  for  dynamic  change  in  the
competitive  structure  of  agriculture  originate  not  within  agriculture  but
outside  it.
Yet  one  word more,  and  it relates  to  the farmer  himself.  He is  not  a
pawn in  the  game.  He  is torn by conflicting  personal goals,  some of which
have  taken  on  new  motive  force.  The  farmer  has  goals  of  status  and  in-
come  stability;  he  expects  to  drive  a  sleek  automobile  and  wear  fashion-
able  clothes  and send  his  kids to  college.  The  biggest  single  outcome  of  a
generation  of  farm  price  and  income  programs  may  be  that  the  farmer,
who  once  thought  his  economic  woes  were  the  visitation  of  an  unjust
Nature or  a just  God,  is now  convinced  that man-made  economic  systems
have  much  to  do  with  his  economic  welfare.  Let  no  one  discount  the
strength  of  this  element  among  forces-at-work.
POSSIBLE  POLICY  DIRECTIONS
It is tempting  to  continue  with a  sketch of potential  what-to-do-about-
it's.  To  do  so  would transgress  on the topics  of  Dr.  Farris and Dr. Raup.
But  description  is  not  wholly  independent  of  prescription;  in medicine  or
in economics,  we report only  those data that have diagnostic  or therapeutic
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make it easier to distinguish  between:  (  1)  policies to alter the basic control
over  economic  resources  (factors  of production),  (2)  policies  to alter  the
way  the  system  works  (Bain's  "performance")  through  regulation  and
surveillance,  and  (3)  policies  to redistribute  the  product.  The last  is what
Professor  Kenneth  Boulding  calls  the  grant  economy;  it  is what  we  seem
to be  moving  toward.  He estimates  that  13  percent  of  national  income  is
now private  and  public  transfers.
CONCLUDING  OBSERVATIONS
Competitive-structure  policies-basic  policies  and  not  superficial  ac-
tions  such  as  retiring  a  little  more  land  or  increasing  (or  reducing)  a
support  price-are  at  the heart  of  what  is  troubling  agriculture  now  and
will  continue  to  trouble  agriculture  for  some  time  to  come.  It  is  number
one  in  farm  policy  issues,  in  my  opinion.
My remarks  have perhaps not stressed  enough that structural  questions
in  agriculture  are  not  isolated  but  an  integral  part  of  deeply  troubling
issues  of  what  kind  of  an  economy  is  emerging  in  these  United  States  of
America  and what kind we want. Without infringing on Professor Raup but
to  clinch  my  point,  whether or not farming  goes  corporate  may depend  on
whether  all  industry  goes toward  200-firm  conglomerates,  as  some persons
say  is our destiny.
Institutions,  not  technology,  characterize  an  economic  system.  When
we  begin with fundamentals,  we begin  with asking how  the  several  factors
of  production  are  held  and  organized.  In  agriculture  land  is  of  first  con-
cern,  and it will  continue  so  until such  time as  we fabricate  our food from
natural  gas  and  petroleum.  Because  land  as  a  fixed  resource  has  the
capacity to be residual  claimant on  income, I chose to highlight the income
distribution  consequences  of various  landholding  institutions.
Other  factors  of  production  enter  agriculture  rather  fluidly.  However,
the role  and status of labor in agriculture is inseparable from the individual
proprietorship  and  market  exchange  systems  that  have  prevailed  in  our
traditional  agriculture.  If we change  our landholding institutions,  reciprocal
changes  can  be expected  in the institutions  affecting  the man on the land.
At the  least,  the  farmer  who  no  longer  can  trust the  land to  serve  as  his
Linus's blanket of  security will  abandon his vaunted sense  of independence
and  will  turn  to  substitute  measures,  usually  group  action of  one  kind  or
another.
Structural  forces  affecting  the  traditional  market  system  are  numerous
and  some  are  powerful.  These  alone,  apart  from  form  of  landholding,
could  readily  obliterate  farming  as  a  unique  sector  of  the  economy.
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ultimately  introduce value systems,  the first step is to describe  the situation
honestly  and  above  all  to  deny  such  shibboleths  as  that  "nothing  really is
happening"  or "it can't  happen  here."
Opening  remarks  in this  paper  noted  the  choices  between  systems  of
analysis.  Thereupon  one  or  two  systems  were  embraced  for  this  paper.
Many others  are necessarily  omitted. Let me mention two,  possibly as direc-
tions to be pursued another time. The first concerns how to reconcile  private
.interest  and social  interest,  throughout the hierarchy of  aggregated  groups.
This  goal may  let us find the best  way  of doing something  that should  not
be  done  at  all,  or  maximize  something  that  should  not  be  maximized,  or
be efficient  in  the  production  of  an undesirable  output.
A second  approach,  heretofore touched  on lightly,  is that of values  and
goals.  I have noted that goals  for agricultural  policy are  many,  mixed,  and
partly  conflicting  and that it is  a serious  error to accord  undue weight to  a
single  one.  But  I  want  to  mention  two  aspects  of  goals:  the  question  of
whose  goals,  and ends  versus  means  in goals.
Although  at  the  highest  level  of  generalization  we  all  share  certain
national  goals,  at  lower  levels  we  fight  like  felines  and  canines.  In  this
regard  one  question  bothers  me:  how  much  weight  should  be  accorded
the  goals  of  the  people  of  agriculture  themselves-the  men  on the  land?
An awful  lot of opinion giving  has had overtones  of pronouncements  from
on  high.  This  is  true  of  the  advice  offered  freely  by  agricultural  econo-
mists;  maybe  we,  too,  like  to  play  the  role  of  an  elite  corps  dispensing
wisdom.  William Swank of the Ohio Farm Bureau  once  chided  agricultural
economists  for  goading  the  agribusiness  lions  into  swallowing  the  farm-
folk Christians. Do the aspirations  of farm people carry any weight?  Ought
they?  Yet  I will  admit  that  farm  groups  often  seem  dead  set  on  keeping
things  as  they  are,  an  attitude  that dooms them  to disappointment.
With  respect  to  ends  and  means  in  goals,  in  a  democracy  we
are  concerned  not  only for common  values  as  they  affect ends but also  as
they  bear  on  means  for  achieving  them.  That  is,  we  are  properly  circum-
spect  about  the  measures  we  employ  to  arrive  at certain  destinations  for
our  economy  and our society.
Therein  lies  a  contradiction  and  an  excuse  for  a  massive  dose  of
Calvinism.  As  to method, it  is always  attractive  to accept laisser  faire  and
we  still, for  all  our denials,  are steeped  in it. But  as to outcome we  are by
no  means  willing  to  live  with  all  the  consequences  of  allowing  existing
institutional  and power  structures to hold sway unmolested.  May I propose
that  if  we  as  a  nation  are  to  be  heedful  of  our  destiny  we  must  also  be
mindful  of policies  that  shape it.
65Furthermore,  failing  to  plan  and  guide  our  economic  institutions  but
dissatisfied  with  consequences,  we  often  resort  to  plugging  and  patching
and  generally  trying  to  offset  the  results  we  were  not  willing  to  forestall.
I  would  argue  that  this  is  not  the  highest  level  of performance  and  one
that,  in  considering  competitive-structure  policies  for U.S.  agriculture,  we
would  do well to avoid.
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